The Israel–Hamas War and the Violent Deadlock: A Review of Two-State Alternatives in Contemporary Geopolitical Contexts
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Abstract
The Israel–Hamas war, particularly its most recent escalation, has underscored the structural failures of peace processes in the Middle East and raised profound questions about the viability of the Two-State Solution. This article examines the Israel–Hamas conflict as a manifestation of protracted social conflict rooted in structural power asymmetries, Palestinian statelessness, and Israel’s state-centric security paradigm, within the context of contemporary geopolitics. Drawing on theories of protracted social conflict, securitization, and conflict management, the article argues that recurrent violence is not merely the result of short-term strategic choices by political actors, but rather a product of entrenched structural conditions. By tracing the evolution of the Two-State Solution from the 1947 UN Partition Plan through the Oslo Accords to the current multipolar global order, the analysis demonstrates that while the two-state framework retains strong normative legitimacy, it lacks the structural foundations necessary for its realization.The findings suggest that under contemporary geopolitical conditions, the Two-State Solution has reached a state of “structural deadlock.” Rather than functioning as a genuine pathway to conflict resolution, it increasingly operates as a mechanism of conflict management that stabilizes an unjust status quo. Continued reliance on the two-state framework without addressing underlying power structures, security discourses, and the lack of international accountability risks normalizing violence and prolonging injustice. The article concludes by calling for a rethinking of peace strategies grounded in rights, equality, and structural justice as essential conditions for sustainable peace in Israel–Palestine.
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